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Reports are written up later to please everyone involved.
I was on the helm of a 60,000 ton freighter when we ran aground
leaving the Orinoco river. The other people on the bridge were
the second mate and a Venezuelan pilot. The ship was registered
in Monrovia, owned by a German company (registered in Panama)
with a German crew. The investigation was held in the US where
we had to go into a dry dock to inspect for damage.
At that time my English was probably better than the mate's or
the pilot's, but during the investigation I was not asked many questions,
since the captain did not want to point fingers and embarrass or cause
bad feelings with the pilots association.
You can guess what the real problem was.....
Walter Knopf
----- Original Message -----
From: "Norm of Bandersnatch" <>
To: "Kevin Redden" <>; "patrick Benvenutti"
<>
Cc: "TWL2:" <>; "A LiveAboardList"
<>
Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2006 10:24 PM
Subject: lv-ab: RE: Exxon Valdez
>
> I have read the NTSB report at the link below.
>
> It concentrates on crew fatigue due to undermanning. I can vouch for
that.
> When I first went to sea on "stick boats", freighters with cargo booms,
> there were 45 men aboard. As the years went by the crews got smaller.
> When I retired in 1996 there were 21 men on a 750' box boat that makes 23
> Kts. The foreign box boats of similar style had 13 men, according to
their
> officers I met ashore in Hong Kong. The even have glass toilets on the
> bridge so the watchstanders don't need relief to legally pee.
>
> The shipowners, to maximize profits, have requested the regulatory
> authorities, in the case of the USA that means the USCG, to allow them to
> reduce crew size, the easiest way to transfer money from the expense
column
> to the profit column. It's not just Exxon, it's all of them.
>
> But in the more complete report of the Valdez crash I read many years ago
> there was much more. The report I read was prepared by the State of
Alaska
> and was flawed with blather and innuendo, but it did extensively quote the
> Federal report and may still be available.
>
> For example, the crash happened just after midnight, when the watch
> changed. This is a most sensitive time because it takes a while for the
> oncoming watch to get a good handle on the situation, especially one that
> is changing quickly as this one was. I think we all can identify here.
> This was strongly exacerbated by the fatigue that saturated the entire
deck
> gang from the long hours working cargo.
>
> The oncoming mate was in the chartroom desperately trying to ascertain the
> ships position almost up to the time of impact.
>
> The sailor on lookout, on the starboard bridge wing, a woman, was
> inexperienced and failed to report navigation marks properly. In all my
> time at sea I have never been shipmates with a female officer (and only
one
> black officer, an engineer). The very rare (in 27 years, that would be
> about three) unlicensed female crewmembers were not highly regarded by
> their peers. In the last few years we did have some promising female
> cadets (officers in training) but with the American Merchant Marine drying
> up it was too little, too late.
>
> The helmsman had just arrived on the ship and was unfamiliar with the
> steering gear which caused a serious delay switching from automatic to
> manual steering in the dark wheelhouse to turn the ship after the order to
> turn was started. It usually goes "change to hand steering", and after
the
> change is made "right ten degrees rudder and steady on course so-and-so".
>
> The ship was outside the channel, to the left, to avoid hitting ice.
> Conflicting orders were given as to exactly where to start the turn back
> into the channel. This caused confusion in the fatigued mate adding to
the
> delay in executing the turn.
>
> Two or three of the five USCG radars installed just to prevent this
> situation by warning the ship that it was standing into danger were
> inoperative and had been for some time. Lack of funding was cited in the
> report as the reason. Perhaps the required money was being spent for
> "safety inspections" of pleasure boats down south.
>
> I wouldn't be surprised if there was even more involved, but that's what I
> remember reading.
>
>
> Norm
> S/V Bandersnatch
> Lying 30 07.715N 081 38.394W
> Julington Creek Estuary FL
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