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From: Norm of Bandersnatch (no email)
Date: Tue Nov 14 2006 - 23:24:24 EST
I have read the NTSB report at the link below.
It concentrates on crew fatigue due to undermanning. I can vouch for that.
When I first went to sea on "stick boats", freighters with cargo booms,
there were 45 men aboard. As the years went by the crews got smaller.
When I retired in 1996 there were 21 men on a 750' box boat that makes 23
Kts. The foreign box boats of similar style had 13 men, according to their
officers I met ashore in Hong Kong. The even have glass toilets on the
bridge so the watchstanders don't need relief to legally pee.
The shipowners, to maximize profits, have requested the regulatory
authorities, in the case of the USA that means the USCG, to allow them to
reduce crew size, the easiest way to transfer money from the expense column
to the profit column. It's not just Exxon, it's all of them.
But in the more complete report of the Valdez crash I read many years ago
there was much more. The report I read was prepared by the State of Alaska
and was flawed with blather and innuendo, but it did extensively quote the
Federal report and may still be available.
For example, the crash happened just after midnight, when the watch
changed. This is a most sensitive time because it takes a while for the
oncoming watch to get a good handle on the situation, especially one that
is changing quickly as this one was. I think we all can identify here.
This was strongly exacerbated by the fatigue that saturated the entire deck
gang from the long hours working cargo.
The oncoming mate was in the chartroom desperately trying to ascertain the
ships position almost up to the time of impact.
The sailor on lookout, on the starboard bridge wing, a woman, was
inexperienced and failed to report navigation marks properly. In all my
time at sea I have never been shipmates with a female officer (and only one
black officer, an engineer). The very rare (in 27 years, that would be
about three) unlicensed female crewmembers were not highly regarded by
their peers. In the last few years we did have some promising female
cadets (officers in training) but with the American Merchant Marine drying
up it was too little, too late.
The helmsman had just arrived on the ship and was unfamiliar with the
steering gear which caused a serious delay switching from automatic to
manual steering in the dark wheelhouse to turn the ship after the order to
turn was started. It usually goes "change to hand steering", and after the
change is made "right ten degrees rudder and steady on course so-and-so".
The ship was outside the channel, to the left, to avoid hitting ice.
Conflicting orders were given as to exactly where to start the turn back
into the channel. This caused confusion in the fatigued mate adding to the
delay in executing the turn.
Two or three of the five USCG radars installed just to prevent this
situation by warning the ship that it was standing into danger were
inoperative and had been for some time. Lack of funding was cited in the
report as the reason. Perhaps the required money was being spent for
"safety inspections" of pleasure boats down south.
I wouldn't be surprised if there was even more involved, but that's what I
remember reading.
Norm
S/V Bandersnatch
Lying 30 07.715N 081 38.394W
Julington Creek Estuary FL
> [Original Message]
> From: Kevin Redden <>
> To: patrick Benvenutti <>
> Cc: TWL2: <>
> Date: 11/14/2006 10:11:50 PM
> Subject: T&T: RE: TWL2: drug testing
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: patrick Benvenutti [mailto:]
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2006 8:29 PM
> > Subject: RE: TWL2: drug testing
> >
> > And to think all of this testing came as a result of the Exxon Valdez
> > accident that was a direct result of alcohol. Go figure?
>
> No, the USCG rules for drug testing were not a result of the Exxon Valdez
(they
> pre-dated the accident), and no, the Exxon Valdez accident was not a
direct
> result of alcohol!
>
> Drug testing in the US transportation industry started two year before
the Exxon
> Valdez accident. They came into play because of January 1987 accident
where an
> Amtrak train collided with a string of Conrail diesels near Chase,
Maryland,
> killing sixteen and injuring 175. Subsequent investigation found that
marijuana
> use likely had impaired a Conrail engineer.
>
> Drug testing of all US commercial mariners, pilots, railroad employees
and truck
> drivers have been a fact of life since then. The drug testing programs
were in
> place well prior to the Exxon Valdez accident.
>
> The primary cause of the grounding of the Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef in
Prince
> William Sound was not because of alcohol, but rather due to the fact that
the
> third mate who was in command of the watch and was navigating the ship at
the
> time, missed a turn and ran over the reef. Yes, the captain had been
drinking
> and that was a contributing factor, but the root cause was the third
mate's
> failure to make a course change when approaching Bligh Reef. While the
NTSB no
> longer has the full accident investigation report available on line, they
do
> have a synopsis of the accident at
> http://ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1990/M90_26_31A.pdf.
>
> Kevin Redden
>
>
>
>
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